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A Financing Strategy for the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund 
 
Abstract 
 
The New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority (NJTTFA or TTFA) is an independent 
agency of the New Jersey state government that is responsible for administering the 
Transportation Trust Fund (TTF of “the Fund”), which is used to fund transportation capital 
project expenditures by the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) and the NJ 
TRANSIT commuter-rail and bus system.  The TTF is essential for maintaining, improving, and 
repairing New Jersey’s infrastructure system.  However, since the TTFA was created in 1984, it 
has been inadequately financed by the state government and has irresponsibly issued enormous 
amounts of debt.  Because of this, it has now it has run into major financing problems.  
Currently, the TTF’s revenues are insufficient to cover its increasing debt obligations.  Because 
of this, the TTF is expected to be bankrupt by July of this year (2011).  If this happens, New 
Jersey will be left without any financing for its already-troubled infrastructure system. 
 This has become a major cause of concern for the State of New Jersey.  For years, 
politicians and residents across the state have been unable to come to an agreement on how to 
best solve this growing problem.  Because of this, financing strategies in the past have amounted 
to little more than temporary “Band-Aid” solutions focused principally on the issuance of 
massive amounts of debt.  Now, the outstanding debt of the TTF has built up to the point that, in 
just a few short months, revenues will be insufficient to cover existing debt obligations.  The 
New Jersey state government needs to take drastic action and adopt a long-term financing 
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strategy that will allow the TTFA to meet its debt obligations and pay down outstanding debt, 
while still being able to fund essential transportation and infrastructure projects across the state. 
 This paper will examine the causes and effects of the current funding deficit, as well 
various proposed solutions and strategies.  After an in-depth examination of these topics, I will 
devise a recommended solution for solving the current deficit crisis faced by the TTF and for 
providing long-term financing for transportation requirements.  The results will show that the 
most logical and effective long-term financing strategy will hinge upon an increase in state 
gasoline taxes, which are currently among the lowest in the nation.  However, solving the 
problem will also require new sources of revenue and stringent financial management. 
 
1. Legislative History of the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund 
 
The New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority (NJTTFA or TTFA) is an independent 
agency of the New Jersey state government whose sole purpose is to administer the 
Transportation Trust Fund (TTF or “the Fund”) to finance the annual capital program of the New 
Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) and NJ TRANSIT.  The TTF is New Jersey’s 
funding mechanism for 13,469 lane miles of roads and 2,300 state-owned bridges, as well as the 
third-largest commuter rail and bus system in the United States.  In addition, the TTF also 
allocates aid to cities and towns for local transportation needs (Kaske “Transportation Debt”).  
Essentially, it is used to maintain, improve, and repair New Jersey’s roads and bridges. 
The TTFA was established in 1984 with the passage of the Transportation Trust Fund 
Statute (NJSA 27:1B et al.), signed into law by Governor Thomas Kean.  Throughout the 1970s 
and early 1980s, prior to the establishment of the TTFA, New Jersey’s transportation system was 
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funded through erratic General Fund appropriations and bond issues.  This unstable source of 
funding led to an alarming deterioration in one of the most heavily-used infrastructure systems in 
the country.  The TTF was established to provide “a stable and assured method of financing the 
planning, acquisition, engineering, construction, reconstruction, repair and rehabilitation of the 
State’s transportation system…” (NJSA 27:1B-2).  It was created as an independent agency to 
finance Trust Fund expenditures using state appropriations, as well as its own authority to issue 
bonds.  It was to have no involvement in the selection or management of capital projects. 
Initially, the TTF was set to expire in 21 years without reauthorization.  It was to fund a 
four-year, $250 million annual capital improvement program over the course of fiscal years 1985 
through 1988.  $143 million of this was to come from annual appropriations from the General 
Fund, while the remainder was to be supported by bond issuances.  State appropriations would 
include $88 million from state motor fuels (or gasoline) taxes (2.5 cents per gallon out of the 
total 8 cent per gallon gasoline tax), $24.5 million in contributions from toll road authorities, and 
$30 million from heavy truck tax increases (3 cent differential on motor fuel taxes, raising the 
tax from 8 cents per gallon to 11 cents per gallon for diesel fuels). 
In January 1988, New Jersey authorized an additional seven-year capital improvement 
program for fiscal years 1989 through 1995 in the amount of $365 million annually.  Of this 
$365 million, $331 million would come from state appropriations, with the remainder from bond 
issuances.  The increase in General Fund appropriations was to be supported by an additional 4.5 
cents on the motor fuels tax, up from 2.5 cents per gallon to 7 cents per gallon.  This included an 
additional 2 cent appropriation on the existing 8 cent tax and a 2.5 cent increase in the tax from 8 
cents per gallon to 10.5 cents per gallon (or 11 cents per gallon to 13.5 cents per gallon for the 
diesel fuels tax).  In February 1991, the New Jersey State Legislature passed the “Cap Lift” 
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Legislation, which increased the capital improvement program authorization from $365 million 
to $565 million for the fiscal years 1991 and 1992.  In May 1992, this cap lift program was 
extended through fiscal year 1995. 
In May 1995, the Transportation Trust Fund was once again reauthorized with a $700 
million annual capital improvement program covering fiscal years 1996 through 2000.  The 
appropriation of motor fuels taxes was increased from 7 cents per gallon to 8 cents per gallon in 
fiscal year 1999, and to 9 cents per gallon in fiscal year 2000 and every year thereafter.  The 
reauthorization also replaced the aggregate bonding cap of $1.7 billion in total outstanding debt 
with an annual bonding cap of $700 million, increased the maximum maturity on bonds from 11 
years to 21 years, and eliminated any expiration date for the TTFA.  For fiscal year 1998, the 
State Legislature approved a one-year cap lift from $700 million to $900 million.  Yet another 
cap lift from $700 million to $900 million was approved for fiscal year 2000. 
In July 2000, the Transportation Trust Fund was reauthorized once again.  This time, the 
annual capital program was increased from $700 million to $900 million for fiscal year 2001 and 
to $950 million for every year thereafter.  The annual bonding cap was also decreased from $700 
million to $650 million.  In addition to annual appropriations from motor fuel taxes, tolls, and 
heavy truck taxes, the reauthorization also added appropriations from portions of the Petroleum 
Products Gross Receipt Tax and the existing general sales tax.  Dedication of the Petroleum 
Products Gross Receipts Tax was set at $100 million for fiscal year 2001 and at $200 million for 
every year thereafter.  Dedication of the Sales and Use Tax was set at $80 million for fiscal year 
2002, $140 million for fiscal year 2003, and $200 million for every year thereafter. 
The most recent Trust Fund reauthorization was passed in March 2006, increasing the 
annual capital improvement program from $900 million to $1.6 billion.  The dedication of motor 
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fuel taxes was increased from 9 cents per gallon to 10.5 cents per gallon, with annual revenue 
appropriations to be no less than $483 million.  In addition, the annual bonding cap was 
increased from $650 million to $1.6 billion, although the cap was to be reduced by any revenue 
appropriations in excess of $895 million.  The maximum bond maturity was also increased from 
21 years to 31 years. 
In November 2006, New Jersey voters passed a constitutional amendment to dedicate all 
10.5 cents of the existing motor fuels tax for transportation capital improvement programs 
(state.nj.us/ttfa). 
 
2. Current Financing for the Transportation Trust Fund 
 
Presently, the majority of the TTF’s revenues come from constitutionally-dedicated gasoline and 
fuel taxes, namely the motor fuels tax and the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax, as well as 
a portion of New Jersey’s general sales tax, the Sales and Use Tax. 
Since 1989, the excise tax on motor fuels has been 10.5 cents per gallon on the sale of 
gasoline and 13.5 cents per gallon on diesel fuel.  Of the 13.5 cent tax on diesel fuel, only 10.5 
cents are constitutionally-dedicated for transportation services, while the remaining 3 cents are 
included as an element of “heavy truck fees,” which are statutorily earmarked for transportation 
(see below).  Total revenues generated by the motor fuels tax, which is collected by the Division 
of Taxation, approximate $553 million annually.  Of this amount, $528 million comes from the 
10.5 cent tax on gasoline and diesel fuel, and the remaining $25 million comes from the 
additional 3 cent tax on diesel fuel.  Of the $528 million, the TTFA is appropriated $483 million, 
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while the remaining $45 million is appropriated to NJ TRANSIT’s operating budget for “repair 
and rehabilitation” purposes (state.nj.us/ttfa). 
Additional constitutional funding comes from the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts 
Tax, which is imposed on all companies engaged in refining and/or distributing petroleum 
products for distribution within the state.  This tax is imposed at a rate of 2¾ percent on gross 
receipts from the first sale of petroleum products in New Jersey.  This rate is increased to 4 
percent for fuel oils, aviation fuels, and motor fuels.  In combination with the 10.5 cent excise 
tax on motor fuels, this brings the total tax on motor fuels to 14.5 cents.  In 2010, revenues raised 
from the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax equaled $216.3 million.  The New Jersey State 
Constitution mandates that not less than $200 million of the total tax be dedicated for 
transportation purposes each year.  This $200 million is equal to the amount appropriated 
annually to the TTF since 2002.  Remaining revenues from the tax are dedicated to the State’s 
General Fund (state.nj.us/ttfa). 
In addition to the motor fuels tax and the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax, the 
TTF also receives a portion of New Jersey’s Sales and Use Tax, which, as of 2006, is equal to 7 
percent of most retail sales, rentals, etc.  In 2010, revenues from the sales tax totaled $7,879.9 
million.  The New Jersey State Constitution mandates that no less than $200 million be dedicated 
annually to transportation capital improvement purposes.  The Trust Fund statute identifies that 
sales tax receipts from new vehicle purchases are the component of the Sales and Use Tax 
intended to generate revenues for the TTF.  Since 2004, the TTF has received $200 million 
annually from the Sales and Use Tax (state.nj.us/ttfa). 
In addition to the constitutionally-dedicated revenues discussed above, which account for 
the majority of the TTF’s appropriations, the fund also receives a portion of its revenues from 
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statutorily-earmarked funds.  These include “Good Driver” vehicle registration surcharge fees, 
heavy truck registration fees, and toll road contributions.  However, the annual Appropriation 
Act, which has precedence over the Transportation Trust Fund Act, allows the Legislature to 
dedicate as much of or as little of the statutorily-earmarked funds to the TTF as it sees fit 
(state.nj.us/ttfa). 
 “Good driver surcharge” fees are currently $7.50 on passenger vehicle registrations and 
$37.50 on commercial vehicle registrations.  Prior to the Transportation Trust Fund Renewal 
Legislation in 1995, these fees were $15 on pre-1989 passenger vehicles, $40 on post-1989 
passenger vehicles, and $75 on commercial vehicles.  Over the past decade, the annual revenues 
collected from these fees have ranged from $60.3 million in 2001 and 2003 to $81.7 million in 
2005, averaging around $70 million annually.  In 2010, good driver surcharges amounted to 
revenues of $70.9 million.  Nevertheless, state statute only dedicates such revenues to the TTF 
“as needed.”  As such, the TTF has not actually received any revenues from the good driver 
surcharges since 2001 (state.nj.us/ttfa). 
The second of the earmarked funds is heavy truck registration fees, which contains three 
components.  The first is an increase in registration fees for all trucks registered in New Jersey 
weighing more than 18,000 pounds.  The Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) does not actually 
track revenues from the increase in these fees.  The second is a decal fee imposed on all trucks 
subject to the motor fuels tax, which was actually ruled unconstitutional.  The final component is 
the additional 3 cent tax on diesel fuels, which generates around $25 million per year, as 
discussed above.  Despite the fact that at least $30 million in revenues collected from heavy 
truck fees are earmarked for the TTF, the Fund has not actually received any revenues from any 
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of the components of these fees since 2001.  Instead, they have gone to the State’s General Fund 
(state.nj.us/ttfa). 
The final set of earmarked revenues dedicated to the TTF is contractual contributions 
from the New Jersey Turnpike Authority (NJTA; which merged with the New Jersey Highway 
Authority in 2003) and South Jersey Transportation Authority (SJTA).  Since the TTF’s 
inception, highway toll road authorities have been required to contribute $24.5 million annually 
to the TTF.  Originally $12 million of this came from the NJTA, $10 million came from the New 
Jersey Highway Authority, and $2.5 million came from the SJTA.  After merging with the New 
Jersey Highway Authority in 2003, the NJTA became responsible for the sum of their $22 
million contributions (state.nj.us/ttfa).  As of 2010, this amount has been increased to $25.6 
million (NJTA 2010 Financial Reports).  Along with the $2.5 million contribution from the 
SJTA, this brings total toll road contributions to the State for transportation capital purposes to 
$28.1 million.  Of this amount, the TTF has been appropriated $12 million annually since 2007, 
while the remaining amounts have been appropriated to the General Fund for NJDOT and NJ 
TRANSIT operations and maintenance budgets (state.nj.us/ttfa). 
Since 2007, annual revenues for the TTF have totaled $895 million: $883 million from 
constitutionally-dedicated revenues plus $12 million from toll road contributions.  For a 
complete overview of annual revenues appropriated to the TTF, see Table 1.  These revenues are 
supplemented by interest income from investments and are used to cover current year debt 
services for both the TTFA and NJ TRANSIT, as well as the TTFA’s operating costs.  Whatever 
revenues remain are appropriated to transportation capital project payments, and are commonly 
referred to as “pay-as-you-go” capital.  After appropriating all revenues, whatever needed 
financing remains for cash outlays is raised through the issuance of bonds (state.nj.us/ttfa).  For 
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an illustration of the flow of revenues through the TTF, see Chart 1 (Note: “Toll Road 
Contributions” are now $28.1 million). 
 
Table 1: Appropriation Revenues ($ Millions) 
(Source: Transportation Trust Fund Authority) 
 
 
Constitutionally 
Dedicated Revenues 
($Million) 
Statutory Earmarked Funds 
($Million) Total 
FY 
Motor 
Fuels 
Petro 
Gross Sales Tax 
Sub-
Total 
Motor 
Fuels 
Heavy 
Truck 
Fees 
Toll 
Roads 
Good 
Driver 
Surch. Other 
Sub- 
Total 
Grand 
Total 
1985 88.0     88.0 0.0 20.0 24.5   66.0 110.5 198.5 
1986 88.0     88.0 0.0 30.0 24.5   5.5 60.0 148.0 
1987 88.0     88.0 0.0 30.0 24.5   0.5 55.0 143.0 
1988 88.0     88.0 0.0 30.0 24.5   58.5 113.0 201.0 
1989 88.0     88.0 188.5 30.0 24.5   0.0 243.0 331.0 
1990 88.0     88.0 188.5 30.0 24.5   0.0 243.0 331.0 
1991 88.0     88.0 188.5 30.0 24.5   0.0 243.0 331.0 
1992 88.0     88.0 188.5 30.0 24.5   0.0 243.0 331.0 
1993 88.0     88.0 See Note 1 
See 
Note 1 24.5   42.5 67.0 155.0 
1994 88.0     88.0 See Note 1 
See 
Note 1 24.5   47.9 72.4 160.4 
1995 88.0     88.0 See Note 1 
See 
Note 1 24.5   100.9 125.4 213.4 
1996 88.0     88.0 See Note 1 
See 
Note 1 24.5   84.1 108.6 196.6 
1997 280.0     280.0 See Note 1 
See 
Note 1 24.5   0.0 24.5 304.5 
1998 280.0     280.0   30.0 24.5 45.8 0.0 100.3 380.3 
1999 320.0     320.0   30.0 24.5 80.0 9.2 143.7 463.7 
2000 360.0     360.0   30.0 24.5 60.0 8.6 123.1 483.1 
2001 405.0 100.0   505.0   30.0 24.5 60.0 81.9 196.4 701.4 
2002 405.0 200.0 80.0 685.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 685.0 
2003 405.0 200.0 140.0 745.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 745.0 
2004 405.0 200.0 200.0 805.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 805.0 
2005 405.0 200.0 200.0 805.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 805.0 
2006 405.0 200.0 200.0 805.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 805.0 
2007 483.0 200.0 200.0 883.0   0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 895.0 
2008 483.0 200.0 200.0 883.0   0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 895.0 
2009 483.0 200.0 200.0 883.0   0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 895.0 
2010 483.0 200.0 200.00 883.0   0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 895.0 
2011 483.0 200.0 200.0 883.0   0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 895.0 
Note 1: Appropriation was set to cover debt service only and did not correspond with specific earmarked revenues. 
Amounts are shown here in General Fund Other Category. 
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Chart 1 
(Source: Transportation Trust Fund Authority) 
 
 
 
The TTFA is authorized to issue its own bonds to finance NJDOT and NJ TRANSIT 
authorized capital projects.  Current statute limits the maturity of these bonds to 31 years and 
imposes a bonding cap at $1.6 billion of new debt each year.  However, unused bonding 
authority carries forward to future years, and, as of March 21, 2011, equals $1,641,259,284.  The 
bonding cap is reduced each year by the amount of any revenue appropriations exceeding $895 
million, although this has never occurred.  At the end of fiscal year 2011 in June 2011, it is 
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estimated that the TTFA will have outstanding debt totaling $12,462,875,716 (state.nj.us/ttfa).  
For a complete overview of the TTF’s debt history, see Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Outstanding Bonds/Debt Service History (As of 3-21-2011) 
(Source: Transportation Trust Fund Authority) 
 
FY New Money 
Issues 
Refunding 
Bonds 
Bonds 
Retired 
Outstanding 
Debt Total 
Annual Debt 
Service 
1985 61,270,000 
 
0 61,270,000 1,597,616 
1986 0 
 
4,635,000 56,635,000 8,713,860 
1987 200,000,000 
 
4,855,000 251,780,000 14,232,608 
1988 125,000,000 
 
67,875,000 308,905,000 32,825,140 
1989 0 
 
26,660,000 282,245,000 46,052,434 
1990 0 
 
30,040,000 252,205,000 46,034,334 
1991 0 
 
31,475,000 220,730,000 46,005,944 
1992 275,000,000 
 
33,070,000 462,660,000 51,055,769 
1993 500,000,000 
 
56,495,000 906,165,000 86,882,983 
1994 400,000,000 
 
83,825,000 1,222,340,000 96,429,269 
1995 187,000,000 
 
102,345,000 1,306,995,000 162,572,894 
1996 334,065,000 1,592,700,000 1,358,400,000 1,875,360,000 87,011,268 
1997 714,340,000 
 
48,050,000 2,541,650,000 184,069,404 
1998 703,940,000 
 
91,175,000 3,154,415,000 248,737,046 
1999 700,000,000 
 
116,385,000 3,738,030,000 305,856,333 
2000 900,000,000 
 
142,785,000 4,495,245,000 355,406,248 
2001 0 
 
166,410,000 4,328,835,000 407,619,738 
2002 1,015,000,000 1,191,450,000 1,398,575,000 5,136,710,000 476,663,766 
2003 0 678,100,000 781,455,000 5,033,355,000 446,063,066 
2004 924,810,000 
 
191,540,000 5,766,625,000 455,421,535 
2005 996,405,000 2,629,725,000 2,970,290,000 6,422,465,000 447,32,745 
2006 2,200,071,792 1,689,915,000 1,980,200,000 8,332,251,792 538,869,729 
2007 0 0 225,925,000 8,106,326,792* 598,559,010 
2008 1,171,055,000 0 238,725,000 9,038,656,792* 639,129,457 
2009 1,538,975,607 0 266,705,000 10,310,927,355* 696,196,854 
2010 1,156,753,361 
 
281,170,000 11,186,510,716* 770,468,759 
2011(to date) 1,000,000,000 499,975,000 823,610,000 11,862,875,716 800,292,276 
2011(est) 600,000,000 0 0 12,462,875,716 
 
Total 15,703,685,760 8,281,865,000 11,522,675,000 
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The TTFA’s current financing strategy is clearly not sustainable.  It is estimated that, by 
July 2011, which is the beginning of fiscal year 2012, debt service costs will exceed appropriated 
revenues, leaving no funds available for new capital outlays for infrastructure improvement 
(Kaske “Transportation Debt”).  With no plan in place to correct the TTF’s serious lack of 
funding, New Jersey is running out of time and options.  Already, the state is feeling the squeeze.  
In October of 2010, Governor Chris Christie backed out of a joint project with the Federal 
Transit Administration and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to build a new 
railroad tunnel under the Hudson River, citing lack of available funds (“Christie Gets Off the 
Train”). 
 
3. The Debt Burdens of the Transportation Trust Fund 
 
The TTFA’s current state of financial crisis is nothing new.  According to the Regional Plan 
Association: 
 
It didn’t happen overnight but gradually: Over the last 25 years, we have bought 
ourselves major transportation improvements—road widenings, interchange 
redesigns, new rail lines and countless other projects—without raising the money 
necessary to pay for them.  Instead, we’ve borrowed money.  We have 
borrowed—and we continue to borrow—so much money that nearly every dollar 
we raise in taxes for transportation projects from the gas tax and other taxes, 
almost $900 million a year, is instead going to pay off interest and principal on 
bonds issued years ago (Regional Plan Association 3). 
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 The State of New Jersey has been struggling with this problem for the better part of the 
past decade, but policymakers have yet to take any real steps toward a solution.  Back in January 
2003, former New Jersey Governor James E. McGreevey established a Blue Ribbon 
Transportation Commission to examine the issue and recommend a long-term financial strategy 
to ensure the financial health of the TTF.  In its report issued in November 2003, the 
Commission found that, without substantial capital investment, the condition of the State’s 
infrastructure system would rapidly deteriorate over the following decade.  It estimated that the 
required annual capital program for NJDOT and NJ TRANSIT would be $3.1 billion, 
substantially more than the capital program from the 2004 fiscal year.  However, it also found 
that, due to increased reliance on bonding over the previous decade, the TTF would become 
insolvent by July 2006, with all revenues going to cover existing debt service obligations.  What 
made these findings even more alarming was the fact that, if this was to occur, New Jersey 
would also likely lose its federal transportation funding due to its inability to meet matching fund 
investment levels required by federal law (“Blue Ribbon Commission Report”). 
 In light of these findings, the Commission made a series of recommendations to restore 
the Transportation Trust Fund to fiscal health.  Chief among these recommendations was to 
increase revenues to the TTF by implementing a 12.5-cents-per-gallon increase in the State’s 
motor fuels tax (although the increase could potentially be as high as 15 cents per gallon).  As 
the current rate, which had not and still has not been changed since 1988, is only 14.5 cents per 
gallon (10.5 cents from the motor fuels excise tax and 4 cents from the Petroleum Products Gross 
Receipt Tax), this increase would nearly double the existing taxes on motor fuels.  Additional 
recommendations made by the Commission included: 
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• Requiring the TTF capital program to adhere to a 50/50 pay-as-you-go bonding ratio over 
the life of the program; 
• Capping the diversion of revenue to fund maintenance and operation costs at its current 
level, with the goal of eliminating the practice over the following decade; 
• Capping the level of the capital program so as not to exceed the TTF’s financial 
resources; 
• Increasing revenues for NJ TRANSIT operations by adopting equitable fare increases and 
by receiving adequate appropriations from the General Fund to meet its operating needs; 
• Improving efficiency, advancing smart growth, and incorporating best practices at both 
NJDOT and NJ TRANSIT to maximize investments; 
• Mandating public accountability by establishing a Financial Policy Review Committee to 
ensure compliance with strict financial standards and prevent future insolvency of the 
TTF (“Blue Ribbon Commission Report”). 
 
The final recommendation for public accountability in the administration of the TTF 
garnered particular attention following the release of the Commission’s report.  In the report, the 
Commission identified that one of the leading causes for the TTF’s fiscal crisis was a lack of 
accountability for the decisions that brought it about.  Although the TTFA is independent of 
NJDOT, it is staffed by NJDOT employees with no explicit authority to safeguard the solvency 
of the Fund.  According to Martin E. Robins, Director of the Alan M. Voorhees Transportation 
Center at the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University, 
“No single official or body had the specific responsibility and political independence to 
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safeguard the financial solvency of the Trust Fund and to raise warnings about the cumulative 
imprudence of the Trust Fund’s management and no one in official position did,” (Robins 4). 
The Blue Ribbon Transportation Commission’s proposal was presented before a lame-
duck Congress in November 2003 in the hopes that the Congress would enact its 
recommendations as part of the TTF’s upcoming reauthorization.  Nevertheless, the proposal was 
met with great opposition in the State Senate, which was full of anti-tax zealots and politically 
split between Republicans and Democrats at 20-20.  With Congress failing to recognize the 
TTF’s dire financial situation, Governor McGreevey also withdrew his support for the 
Commission’s proposal, claiming that it was not the right time to increase the gas tax.  This was 
despite the fact that several other states, including Ohio, Washington, Indiana, and Washington, 
were all raising their own gas taxes at the same time.  Instead, McGreevey announced that the 
TTFA would continue to tap out its existing bonding capacity (Robins 3). 
 The issue was next seriously tackled by Governor Jon Corzine as part of his overall 
Financial Restructuring and Debt Reduction plan for the State of New Jersey.  With funds now 
set to run out in 2011, Corzine announced in November 2007 that his plan would follow an asset 
monetization initiative focused on three core principles: paying off half of the State’s outstanding 
debt, permanently funding the TTF capital program, and establishing new restrictions on state 
borrowing (Kaske “Corzine Addresses Debt Plans”).  Corzine formally laid out this plan during 
his State of the State address in January 2008, announcing that his restructuring plan called for 
freezing state spending, limiting future spending to revenue growth, capturing the enterprise 
value of toll roads to pay down debt and make capital investments, and limiting future borrowing 
by requiring voter authorization (Schwaneberg).  To capture the enterprise value of toll roads, the 
plan called for massive toll hikes: a 50 percent increase in tolls starting January 1, 2010 on the 
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New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway, and Atlantic City Expressway; followed by an 
additional 50 percent increase every four years until 2022.  In addition, new tolls would be put in 
place on part of Route 440 starting on January 1, 2014.  Tolls would also be increased annually 
based on the consumer price index (CPI) to reflect inflation.  The key component of Corzine’s 
plan, however, was the establishment of a non-profit organization called the Public Benefit 
Corporation (PBC), which would act as the operator for the toll roads and which would be 
legally separate and independent from the State of New Jersey.  The State’s toll road authorities 
would be reorganized into the New Jersey Capital Solutions Corporation (CSC), which would be 
responsible for incorporating the PBC, as well as the Citizen’s Oversight Board.  The PBC 
would be responsible for the issuance of its own private debt, which would be backed by toll 
revenues.  In addition to financing transportation capital expenditures, the borrowings of the 
PBC would be used to pay down New Jersey’s massive debt, including the debt of the TTF 
(“Financial Restructuring and Debt Reduction”).  According to Mark Perkiss, a spokesman for 
the State’s treasury department, “The state’s not going to have an obligation, be it moral, legal, 
or otherwise, to be responsible for the bonds that the PBC issues,” (DM). 
 Merrill Lynch & Co. analyst Philip Villaluz calculated that Corzine’s proposed toll hikes 
could have raised $2.44 billion by 2018 had they been enacted (Kaske “Merrill”).  Despite this, 
as well as the fact that a December 2007 Quinnipiac University poll showed that 55% of New 
Jersey residents would support a doubling of tolls on the Turnpike and the Parkway to support 
transportation construction and help pay down debt (41% said they would not), Corzine’s plan 
was met with tremendous criticism (Kake “Poll”).  While some applauded the Governor’s effort 
to straighten out New Jersey’s budget, many were simply unwilling to swallow the massive toll 
hikes.  Conservatives criticized it as another democratic, “tax-and-spend” plan, and argued that 
17 
 
policymakers should be cutting spending rather than increasing taxes (Heyboer).  Another 
criticism was that toll hikes would encourage motorists to use secondary roads, which would 
cause additional traffic congestion and wear and tear on those roads.  Former NJDOT 
Commissioner Kris Kolluri said that officials anticipated that the toll increases would divert 
traffic by around 10 percent, at least at first (Kaske “Officials”). 
 Unsurprisingly, Corzine’s plan failed to gain support in Congress.  In April 2008, State 
Senator Raymond Lesniak, seeing that lawmakers were unwilling to take the drastic steps 
suggested by Corzine, proposed more moderate toll increases of 50% in 2008 and again five 
years later, with the possibility of also implementing new tolls in the future at the Pennsylvania 
border on Routes 78 and 80 (Kaske “New Jersey Lawmaker”).  By September, Congress had yet 
to approve any toll increases.  Maria Matesanz, an analyst for Moody’s Investor Service, 
defended the toll hikes, stating, “There are a lot of toll agencies that are implementing toll 
increases now and it speaks to the fact that resources for funding transportation infrastructure are 
limited.  Tax revenues, especially in a stressed economy, are less likely to be tapped to fund 
necessary projects, and so governments are turning to tolls and toll agencies to do more of the 
transportation funding.”  The NJTA proposed toll increases on the New Jersey Turnpike of 60 
cents in 2009, 90 cents in 2012, and 30 cents in 2023.  The proposal would also increase the 
average cost for passenger cars on the Parkway by 15 cents in 2009, 25 cents in 2012, and eight 
cents in 2023.  In addition, there would be a 15-cent toll increase for Expressway ramps on the 
Atlantic City Expressway, a 25-cent toll increase just west of Atlantic City, and a $1 increase just 
north of the city (Kaske “New Jersey Officials”).  In October, Congress finally approved the 
proposed toll hikes for 2009 and 2012 (although the 2009 Turnpike toll-hike was slightly 
diminished from 60 cents to 50 cents) to keep the debt service levels for the NJTA from falling 
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below contractual levels and to help fund New Jersey’s $1.25 billion contribution toward the 
proposed $7.6 billion ARC (Access to the Region’s Core) tunnel project to run between Newark 
and New York Pennsylvania Station.  Nonetheless, these toll hikes were much more moderate 
than those originally proposed by Corzine, and the State was required to scale back $2.7 billion 
worth of projects (Kaske “N.J. Approves Toll Hikes”). 
 Nevertheless, in order to continue covering its own debt service obligations and funding 
transportation projects, the TTFA continued issuing new debt, with officials approving up to $1.6 
billion of debt at the end of October (Kaske “N.J. Transportation Officials”).  With the TTFA 
continuing to use debt as its primary source of funding, debt service levels continued to approach 
the level of annual appropriations.  After the interest rates on bonds issued in November 2008 
wound up being higher than anticipated, the TTF’s debt service level rose even higher than 
expected.  Steve Hanson, the former executive director of the TTFA and CFO of NJDOT, 
recognized the growing cause for concern.  In March 2009, he stated, “Our problem is going to 
come in fiscal 2011 as debt service gets closer to the $895 million mark.”  Transportation 
officials realized that by July 2011, the start of fiscal year 2012, debt service costs would grow 
beyond dedicated revenues, and the TTF would be in dire straits (Kaske “Lawmakers”). 
 In November 2009, Chris Christie defeated incumbent Governor Jon Corzine in New 
Jersey’s gubernatorial race.  The Republican Governor-elect promised to cut back on spending 
and borrowing to reign in New Jersey’s budget, while speaking out against any tax increases on 
already-burdened New Jersey citizens, including a potential gas tax boost to provide additional 
funding for the TTF.  Christie stated, “The people of New Jersey are suffering.  They are 
suffocating under these taxes.  We can’t do it.  We should go as pay as you go on the 
Transportation Trust Fund from current budget funds,” (Kaske “Tranportation Debt”).  The 
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problem was, and remains, that without additional revenues, all “pay-as-you-go” financing will 
be completely usurped by debt service obligations to pay off interest and principal on 
outstanding debt.  As of August 2010, with less than a year remaining before the Trust Fund 
would be completely exhausted, the Christie Administration had yet to formulate a refinancing 
plan.  Assistant state treasurer Steven Petrecca announced that the State would issue a request for 
proposals for outside financial advisers to create a plan by looking to the funding mechanisms in 
other states and performing a future cash-flow analysis (Kaske “New Jersey TTFA”). 
 In October 2010, with only $50 million remaining in the TTF (all of which would be 
needed to cover debt services due in December), the New Jersey Legislature approved at $1.4 
billion debt restructuring deal for the TTF.  At that time, Congressional Democrats tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain information from Transportation Commissioner James Simpson about 
the Christie administration’s plans and proposals for funding the TTF beyond fiscal year 2011 
(Kaske “N.J. Legislature”).  Later that same month, Christie terminated the ARC tunnel project, 
which had been a joint venture with the Federal Transit Administration and the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, when it became apparent that costs would exceed what was 
originally budgeted.  Christie commented, “It’s a dollars and cents issue.  I cannot place, upon 
the citizens of the State of New Jersey, an open-ended letter of credit.”  Proponents of the ARC 
tunnel project criticized Christie for pulling the plug on a project on which $600 million had 
already been spent in designing and planning work—a project that purportedly would have 
created 45,000 permanent jobs and 6,000 construction jobs per year, would have gotten 22,000 
cars off the road each day, and would have eliminated nearly 70,000 tons of greenhouse gases 
each year (Frassinelli “Gov. Christie cancels ARC”). 
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 With Christie adamantly opposed to increasing the State’s gas tax to provide financing 
for the TTF, Martin Robins of the Alan M. Vorhees Transportation Center speculated that any 
measure taken by Christie during the year would be “very much of a Band-Aid.”  Many 
speculated that Christie would redirect New Jersey’s $2.7 billion commitment to the cancelled 
ARC tunnel toward New Jersey’s transportation capital program (Frassinelli “Review”).  In 
January of this year, Christie finally announced a five-year, $8 billion capital plan for the TTF.  
As suspected, his plan includes using funds previously allocated for the ARC tunnel to help 
shore up the TTF.  Despite previously criticizing the TTFA’s use of debt, Christie’s plan also 
includes the issuance of $3.6 billion in new debt.  However, this new plan does rely less on debt 
than did previous plans.  In addition, whereas previously-issued bonds require no payments until 
the end of their 30-year lives, the new bonds will be paid off over the course of their lives, 
eliminating the hefty “balloon” payments of the previous bonds. 
 Unsurprisingly, Christie’s plan has been met with harsh criticism for its use of even more 
debt and its short-term fix of using funds diverted from the ARC tunnel.  Democrats have 
particularly criticized Christie for his unwillingness to raise the gas tax.  Jeff Tittel, the director 
of the New Jersey Sierra Club, commented, “Until we’re willing to really come up with a 
comprehensive solution, we’re just going to be stuck in traffic, going nowhere, while our roads 
are crumbling.  [Christie’s proposals] are, at best, a Band-Aid.”  Peter Kasabach, the executive 
director of New Jersey Future, commended the plan for attempting to move the TTF toward 
using less debt and more cash, but felt that it was not a long-term plan: “It addresses the 
immediate need to replenish the Trust Fund, moves away from excessive reliance on debt and 
back toward the ‘pay-as-you-go’ model on which the fund was founded. … This is not, however, 
a sustainable solution to the Trust Fund,” (Frassinelli and Gibson). 
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4. Proposed Solutions and Strategies 
 
Debate rages on over the prudence and long-term viability of Christie’s plan.  There are various 
schools of thought over what is truly the best strategy, or set of strategies, to fix the TTF moving 
forward.  However, most everybody seems to agree on at least two things: 1) New Jersey cannot 
allow the TTF to become insolvent, and 2) It would be financially imprudent for the TTFA to 
continue taking on new unfunded debt to pay off old debt. 
 Obviously, allowing the TTF to run out is simply not an option for the state of New 
Jersey.  Without funds to contribute to its capital program, New Jersey would likely lose its 
eligibility to receive the one-to-one match in funds that it currently receives from the federal 
government.  Without any funds available to dedicate to transportation projects, the State’s 
infrastructure system would fall apart, creating major safety issues and severely damaging New 
Jersey’s already-impaired economy.  Currently, the United States Department of Transportation 
already deems more than half of New Jersey’s roads to be in either mediocre or poor condition, 
with over 700 bridges considered to be structurally deficient.  If the TTF was allowed to become 
insolvent, the Regional Plan Association describes the disastrous situation that would occur:  
 
Only the most critical and urgent repairs would be paid for out of the State’s 
General Fund, which is already under severe fiscal stress.  Any other road or 
transit improvement would be postponed indefinitely.  Regular road maintenance 
would end.  Structurally deficient bridges would close for safety reasons.  The 
productivity of our economy would plummet, as commutes got longer and freight 
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movement got slower.  Businesses and jobs would leave the state.  Incomes would 
go down.  Accident rates would increase (Regional Plan Association 8). 
 
Clearly, inaction is not an option for the State of New Jersey. 
 What also is not an option is to prolong the problem by continuing to restructure the 
TTF’s debt.  For too long, policymakers have avoided making the unpopular decision to provide 
new revenue streams for the TTF by instead issuing ever-increasing amounts of new debt to pay 
for an underfunded capital program.  As a result, debt service obligations have continued to rise 
higher and higher, while revenues have remained flat.  Every time legislators put off the problem 
by issuing more unfunded debt, they made the problem even worse the next time it came due.  
With more and more revenues going to cover debt service obligations, pay-as-you-go capital 
continued to diminish, forcing the TTFA to issue ever-higher levels of debt to fund the capital 
program, which, in turn, only served to increase debt service obligations and diminish available 
pay-as-you-go financing even further.  For the TTF’s pay-as-you-go history, refer to Table 3.  
For an illustration of the TTF’s diminishing pay-as-you-go capital funding, see Chart 2. 
Former New Jersey Commissioner of Transportation Jack Lettiere coined this problem 
the “narcotic of debt.”  According to Martin Robins, “The appeal of the ‘narcotic of debt’ was 
that political leaders could achieve their transportation construction and operational objectives 
for a number of years, while avoiding asking the public to sacrifice, but raising the stakes ever 
higher when the sacrifice would be sought.  At some point this policy would reach a cliff – and 
the cliff is just around the bend,” (Robins 1).  Now, with debt service obligations surpassing 
annual revenues, the TTF has reached that cliff, and simply restructuring the Fund’s massive 
amount of debt yet again is no longer an option.  According to the Regional Plan Association in 
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March 2010, the TTF’s outstanding debt stood at a staggering $11 billion, which will cost the 
State of New Jersey more than $20 billion to repay.  Even if the TTFA were to continue 
borrowing at the rate it has been, additional revenue sources would still be needed to meet rising 
debt service obligations.  In addition, the increasing scale of debt would drive down the TTFA’s 
bond rating and drive up its cost of debt, causing debt service obligations to grow even more 
rapidly (Regional Plan Association 9).  The time is now for New Jersey to rip off the Band-Aid 
and end what Jack Lettiere calls the “narcotic of debt.” 
 
Table 3: Pay-As-You-Go History ($ Millions) 
(Source: Transportation Trust Fund Authority) 
 
FY 
State 
Revenues 
& Interest 
Earnings 
Less TTFA 
Debt Service 
Less NJT 
Program 
Debt Srv. 
Net Pay 
As You Go 
NJDOT/NJT 
Cash 
Outlays 
Percent 
Pay 
As You Go 
1985 169.7 1.6 0.0 168.1 29.6 100.0% 
1986 177.8 8.7 0.0 169.1 123.0 100.0% 
1987 167.8 13.8 0.0 154.0 215.0 71.6% 
1988 225.1 33.4 0.0 191.7 220.0 87.3% 
1989 356.8 46.1 0.0 310.7 250.0 100.0% 
1990 370.0 46.0 0.0 324.0 375.0 86.4% 
1991 362.0 46.1 0.0 316.0 380.0 83.1% 
1992 352.1 46.0 0.0 306.1 520.0 58.9% 
1993 209.1 87.2 0.0 121.8 460.0 26.4% 
1994 149.1 148.7 0.0 .4 505.0 0.1% 
1995 224.4 165.4 0.0 59.0 585.0 10.1% 
1996 182.7 87.0 0.0 95.7 710.0 13.5% 
1997 337.3 182.6 0.0 154.7 800.0 19.3% 
1998 388.0 249.1 0.0 138.9 800.0 17.3% 
1999 464.4 304.6 0.0 159.8 865.0 18.5% 
2000 519.5 354.3 0.0 165.2 715.0 23.1% 
2001 729.7 407.7 34.9 287.1 730.1 39.3% 
2002 721.9 473.1 34.9 213.8 784.6 27.2% 
2003 758.5 448.4 64.9 245.2 945.1 25.9% 
2004 802.1 453.8 82.9 265.4 1,149.1 23.1% 
2005 809.3 227.3 83.9 278.1 1,264.5 22.0% 
2006 826.9 538.9 83.9 204.1 1,358.0 15.0% 
2007 936.1 586.6 111.2 238.3 1,440.0 16.5% 
2008 919.3 643.4 111.5 164.4 1,287.5 12.8% 
2009 900.4 707.2 111.5 81.7 1498.4 5.4% 
2010 906.6 755.6 114.5 36.5 1475.0 4.0% 
2011(est) 906.4 787.6 92.1 26.7 1600.0 1.0% 
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 There are many potential strategies to go about doing this.  A 2009 study by the NGA 
(National Governors Association) Center for Best Practices, “How States and Territories Fund 
Transportation,” identifies an array of both traditional and nontraditional strategies that have 
been used by different states to fund their transportation programs.  Traditional funding sources 
identified include fuel taxes, sales taxes on fuel, vehicle registration fees, bond proceeds, tolls, 
general funds, and a variety of other sources.  Other, less-commonly-used, sources include 
vehicle inspection fees, vehicle rental taxes, advertising revenue, state lottery and gaming funds, 
oil company taxes, vehicle excise taxes, vehicle weight fees, investment income, and other 
licenses, permits, and fees.  The study also identifies a variety of nontraditional funding sources 
that states are increasingly using to supplement traditional sources.  These include innovative 
debt financing strategies that take advantage of new bonding authority, federal credit assistance, 
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and state infrastructure banks; congestion and cordon pricing; public-private partnerships; 
vehicle miles traveled fees; vehicle emissions fees; impact fees; container fees, and traffic 
camera fees.  Of all the funding sources identified in the study, the only one used by all fifty 
states is fuel tax.  All but two states (Alaska and Georgia) impose vehicle registration fees and all 
but three states (South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming) have the authority to issue 
transportation bonds (“How States and Territories Fund Transportation”). 
 Another NGA Center study, “State Policy Options for Funding Transportation,” 
identified six general funding strategies available to states: 
 
• Tax-based strategies for increasing revenues. 
• Tolls and road-pricing schemes to raise revenues. 
• Debt financing to reduce project development costs. 
• Asset leases to raise revenues. 
• Shifting transportation finance responsibilities to local governments. 
• Strategies to reduce long-term growth in highway travel demand (“State Policy Options” 
1-2). 
 
The remainder of this section will examine the pros and cons of each of these strategies, 
including possible funding sources available under each, to determine which strategy, or set of 
strategies, makes the most sense for New Jersey. 
 Under any tax-based strategy, the primary source of funds will be the motor fuels, or gas, 
tax.  At both the federal and state level, gas taxes are the largest source of revenue for 
transportation programs.  In total, gas and vehicle taxes make up the funds for around three-
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quarters of all highway expenditures.  This is not without good reason.  Fuel taxes are paid by 
users of the transportation systems; they are easy and inexpensive to administer; they are difficult 
for taxpayers to evade; they provide steady and predictable revenue streams; and they generate 
substantial amounts revenue at low costs to individual users.  In addition, from an environmental 
standpoint, they give drivers an incentive to purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles.  However, 
using gas taxes a primary source of revenue is not without its disadvantages.  Perhaps the largest 
criticism for a strategy reliant on fuel taxes is concern over their long-term reliability, as 
consumers continue to shift their preferences toward more fuel efficient vehicles and cheaper 
alternative energy sources.  These trends may cause gas tax revenues to decline over the long 
term, which could be especially problematic for states like New Jersey that bond against future 
gas tax revenues, as it could cause bond ratings to fall.  If New Jersey were to move away from 
its reliance on debt, however, this obviously would not be an issue.  Another disadvantage of gas 
taxes is that it is a charge on fuel consumption, which does not directly correlate to highway 
usage, thus creating a variance between price and cost.  Additionally, fuel usage does not 
necessarily correlate to miles driven, road usage, or congestion, thus creating inefficiency when 
it comes to managing transportation demand. 
 It should also be noted that, unless gas taxes are either indexed or repeatedly adjusted by 
legislation, they face an eroding purchasing power over time.  This has been one of the primary 
problems with New Jersey’s gas tax, which has remained constant since 1988.  The declining 
purchasing power of New Jersey’s motor fuels tax is illustrated by Chart 3, which shows how 
the tax has declined as a share of the price of gasoline and diesel fuel.  As it is difficult 
continuously secure legislative approval to adjust gas tax rates, many states have chosen to index 
their rates to either the CPI or the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) highway 
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construction cost index in order to keep pace with inflation and rising construction costs.  (“State 
Policy Options” 7; “Innovative State Transporation” 8).  If New Jersey were to implement an 
adjustment to its gas tax rate, policymakers should consider indexing it to prevent purchase 
power erosion due to rising costs and inflation. 
 
Chart 3: Diminishing Purchasing Power of Motor Fuels Tax 
(Source: “Spiral of Debt,” Regional Plan Association) 
 
 
 
For the TTF, the two other major sources of funds under a tax-based strategy are the 
Petroleum Products Gross Receipt Tax and its portion of the New Jersey Sales and Use Tax.  
Although general sales taxes and additional sales taxes placed on the sale of gasoline (such as the 
Petroleum Products Gross Receipt Tax) are not as widely used to fund transportation programs 
as are gas taxes, many states, including New Jersey, are increasingly using them for that very 
purpose.  The NGA Center reports that state and local sales taxes, including sales taxes imposed 
on gasoline sales, currently fund 2 percent of state and 14 percent of local transit expenditures 
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(“State Policy Options” 8).  The obvious disadvantage involved with using these funds for 
transportation programs is that they represent non-user fees, and that using them for 
transportation purposes means that they cannot be used for other purposes. 
 In addition to the taxes already discussed, a tax-based strategy for increasing revenues 
may also include other funding sources, such as vehicle and passenger license and registration 
fees.  Although New Jersey does collect heavy truck fees and good driver surcharges on 
passenger and commercial vehicle registrations that are statutorily-earmarked for the TTFA, they 
are not constitutionally dedicated to it.  Because of this, they have not actually been appropriated 
to it for nearly a decade.  While legislative appropriations at one time made up a significant 
portion of the TTF’s revenues, they have since been diverted to the General Fund.  New Jersey 
might consider making these, or other new sources of funds, constitutionally-dedicated to the 
TTF to ensure that they are used for transportation purposes.  This was one recommendation 
made by the Regional Plan Association in a 2010 study (Regional Plan Association 11). 
 After the tax-based strategies, the second set of policy options to be examined is toll and 
road-pricing strategies.  Since the 1990s, several factors have spurred an increased interest in 
tolling.  These include the failure of fuel taxes to keep up with funding requirements, 
technological advances in toll collection systems (such as electronic toll collection, or ETC, tags) 
that have made tolls cheaper and easier to collect, and the ability to use toll pricing schemes to 
redistribute demand and improve efficiency.  Toll pricing schemes, or congestion pricing, is a 
relatively new practice that seeks to better match the price for using roads and bridges with the 
demand for using those roads and bridges.  By charging higher tolls when demand is higher, 
tolling authorities can influence travel behavior and mitigate congestion.  Road-pricing schemes 
can vary based on type of vehicle and/or time of day and can even vary in real time based on 
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traffic conditions.  They can be applied to individual lanes (such as High Occupancy or Express 
Toll Lanes), entire roads, or even to entire road networks.  This last approach, which is more 
popular outside of the United States, is called “cordon pricing.”  Cordon pricing essentially 
works by charging fees for any vehicle to enter a designated area, usually a city center.  The 
largest benefit of using congestion pricing is that, by reducing demand at peak times and in peak 
locations, thus decreasing congestion, these schemes can extend the life of existing infrastructure 
and lower the amount of transportation capital requirements for repair and maintenance over the 
long-term (“State Policy Options” 8-11; “Innovative State Transporation” 17-20). 
An additional benefit that tolls have over gas taxes is that they are more direct fees in that 
they charge users for actual use of the roads.  On the contrary though, tolls are much more costly 
and difficult to implement and manage than gas taxes.  Implementing a toll requires 
authorization, tolling facilities, toll collection systems and technology, toll collectors, and a plan 
to manage the traffic that they divert.  They also require coordination among different 
jurisdictions and raise regional equity concerns when tolls collected in one region are used to 
fund projects in another region.   Many people also oppose tolls because they see them as a form 
of double taxation in adjunction with gas taxes (“State Policy Options” 10). 
Beyond traditional tolling and road-pricing strategies, a new, alternative, long-term 
strategy that is gaining support is the use of mileage-based pricing.  A mileage-based pricing 
system would charge a fee based on vehicle miles traveled (VMT).  This could be done using a 
global positioning system (GPS) receiver that would keep track of miles driven and upload the 
information at refueling stations.  A 2007 article from Government Finance Review, discusses 
some of the benefits of a VMT system: 
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Robin Chase, CEO of Massachusetts-based Meadow Networks, advocates a big 
leap forward.  She recommends abandoning all gas taxes and shifting to wireless 
technology.  A small, low-cost computer on board every vehicle would report (in 
real time) miles actually traveled, allowing a realistic government user charge.  
Fees could be adjusted for roadway congestion pricing (premiums to travel on 
peak roads at peak times), by wear and tear related to vehicle weight and 
footprint, and by the vehicle’s emissions (a carbon tax to encourage vehicles with 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions).  Indeed, says Chase, there could be a local 
government bonus—a percentage of road user fees returned to the county, city, or 
neighborhood through which the vehicle traveled, compensating for the burden of 
emissions, noise, and congestion (Peirce). 
 
A VMT fee would have an advantage over tolls in that it would price the entire system of 
using roadways, rather than just particular roads.  Unlike gas taxes, a VMT fee would also not be 
affected over the long-term by the trend toward more fuel-efficient vehicles.  A VMT system 
would not be without flaws, however.  Some major criticisms of a VMT system are that it would 
tax activities that are critical to the execution of daily tasks, would raise privacy concerns over its 
tracking technology, and would eliminate the environmental incentive to buy more fuel-efficient 
cars, which the gas tax currently provides.  In addition, it would be time-consuming and costly to 
retrofit older vehicles with the mileage-tracking technology.  Thus, it would take years to switch 
over to a VMT system (“State Policy Options” 11; “Innovative State Transporation” 22).  
Therefore, a VMT system may not be the best strategy for New Jersey right now, considering the 
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urgency of the TTF’s funding situation.  Nonetheless, it may be an option to consider down the 
road. 
The next set of policy options is debt financing strategies.  As discussed earlier, in its 
current state, it would be imprudent for the TTF to continue relying on debt, and debt financing 
strategies should be avoided in favor of pay-as-you-go strategies.  That is not to say that there are 
not positive advantages to responsible use of debt.  When necessary expenses for capital project 
expenditures outrun annual revenues, borrowing can be used to cover the gap.  Also, whereas 
funding larger projects using only pay-as-you-go revenues may require construction being 
stretched out over several years, which will wind up increasing total project costs, debt can be 
used to finance a project upfront and can thus reduce total project costs.   Despite the benefits 
associated with the strategic use of debt, borrowing places future burdens on the entity, as debt 
must be repaid, with interest.  These debt obligations must be backed by future revenue streams 
and eclipse the amount of revenue available for capital projects, or pay-as-you-go funds.  This 
can obviously become a major problem if a state relies too heavily on debt as a source of funding 
and borrows debt beyond its capacity to repay it using future revenues, which is exactly what 
New Jersey has done over the past two decades.  An additional downside to reliance on debt is 
that high amounts of outstanding debt can cause bond ratings to fall, which will increase 
borrowing rates and cause project costs to rise. 
Beyond traditional borrowing through the issuance of bonds backed by future revenue 
streams, a variety of new financing instruments and tools have allowed states to use debt more 
strategically in recent years.  These include: 
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• Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEE bonds), which are debt financing 
instruments that are backed with federal-aid funds, rather than by the taxing authorities of 
the states. 
• Private-activity bonds (PABs), which are tax-exempt facility bonds that allow private 
participation in projects that meet certain public-purpose criteria, which, since 2005, 
includes “qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities” under the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA-LU). 
• State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs), which are revolving-fund mechanisms that are 
capitalized using federal transportation funds.  SIBs provide direct loans to projects with 
dedicated revenue streams at attractive interest rates.  Principal repayments and interest 
revenues are then used to provide loans for additional projects. 
• Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation (TIFIA) program, which provides 
federal credit assistance to states for qualifying projects by providing subordinated debt 
that serves to reduce interest rates on senior debt (“State Policy Options” 12-13; 
“Innovative State Transporation” 11-14). 
 
Regardless of the form in which debt takes, it still must be repaid.  With the TTF’s current 
revenues already insufficient to cover existing debt obligations, any financing plan, whether 
utilizing debt or not, must increase revenues.  Irresponsible debt-financing strategies are what 
has caused New Jersey’s current transportation crisis.  They are not the answer to it. 
The next set of policy options includes asset leases and other privatization strategies.  The 
NGA Center describes asset leases as “a type of public-private partnership (PPP) in which 
private investors assume some (or all) management control over a transportation facility in return 
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for an equity interest in the revenues it generates or a negotiated payment based on performance 
or capacity availability,” (“State Policy Options” 13).  Essentially, asset leases involve private 
partners taking control of toll roads or bridges and managing them for cash.  Although asset 
leases are common in the airline industry, they are rare for tolled highways.  Nevertheless, there 
have been examples of toll road privatization in recent years, including a 99-year lease of the 
Chicago Skyway Toll Bridge that raised $1.8 billion for the city of Chicago and a 75-year lease 
of the Indiana Toll Road that raised $3.8 billion for the State of Indiana (“Innovative State 
Transporation” 27).  In addition to providing states with large amounts of capital up-front, 
private leases can also provide toll roads with more efficient management in the absence of 
bureaucratic red tape. 
New Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniak first formally pitched the idea to privatize 
New Jersey’s two largest toll roads, the New Jersey Turnpike and the Garden State Parkway, 
back in 2006.  Supporters claim that selling or leasing the roads would generate billions of 
dollars that can be used to pay down state’s debt and fund long-term capital improvements 
(Cataldo).  Although the plan was originally considered by former Governor Corzine, it was met 
with tremendous opposition throughout the state by those who do not trust private companies to 
operate toll roads.  Such opponents fear a lack of public control, large toll hikes, and cost-cutting 
measures that, absent of guarantees for maintaining service and safety levels, may conflict with 
public interest.  Bill Graves, the president and CEO of the American Trucking Association 
(ATA) and former Kansas governor, had harsh criticism for privatization initiatives: “The United 
States cannot maintain a national highway network if key segments are leased to the highest 
bidder.  More than money is at stake.  The leasing of America’s roadways allows states to 
postpone their budget problems without protecting national interests and without a clear 
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understanding of long-term implications,” (Graves).  After heavy public backlash and scrutiny of 
the proposed plan, Corzine and fellow Democrats decided to abandon any privatization plans in 
favor of other asset monetization plans that allow New Jersey citizens to maintain ownership of 
the State’s toll roads and their revenues (Kaske “Corzine: No Privatizing”).  Support for asset-
leasing strategies has since tapered off. 
The next set of strategies is strategies to shift funding responsibilities to regional and 
local governments, which is a growing trend in transportation financing.  A major concern for 
the increasing role of local municipalities in transportation funding is that it could be draining 
money from essential public services like schools, libraries, police forces, and firefighters.  An 
additional concern is that it may be inequitable if local governments are being used to fund 
nonlocal travel.  There are benefits, however.  Funding transportation at the local level enables 
specific fees to be attached to specific projects and allows taxpayers to clearly see their taxes at 
work.  Also, because state traffic is often generated by local land use, it makes sense for local 
governments to contribute to the funding of the projects necessary to accommodate this 
increased traffic.  Recently, New Jersey has begun employing strategies to share the burden of 
funding transportation between the state and local levels of government.  By structuring state, 
local, and private partnerships on state road projects that pass through municipalities, New Jersey 
has been better able to leverage its limited transportation budget on projects that serve both 
regional and local transportation needs.  These partnerships are arranged so that either municipal 
governments or private developers finance the street-connectivity portions of the improvement, 
while the State funds the actual improvements to the main road (“State Policy Options” 16-17). 
The final set of policy options is strategies for reducing growth in travel demand, which 
accordingly reduces funding requirements for capital improvements.  Such strategies include 
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improving coordination between transportation infrastructure and land use planning, promoting 
the use of transit and other modes of transportation to reduce vehicle miles traveled, leveraging 
transit block grants to increase transit capacity, providing financial incentives for transit-oriented 
development, encouraging partnerships with passenger and freight rail, and improving overall 
flexibility in state transportation finance.  One strategy that New Jersey has employed to provide 
incentives for transit-oriented development is to provide “smart growth grants to transit-friendly 
villages that have adopted a land use strategy for achieving compact, transit-supportive, mixed-
use development within walking distance of transit.  New Jersey has also launched the New 
Jersey Future in Transportation (NJFIT) initiative with the stated goal of helping NJDOT in its 
mission to provide more and better traveling options for passenger and freight movement 
through the state.  Under NJFIT, the State is attempting to create a better link between project 
finance and smart growth planning by increasing its funding for local land use planning and 
redevelopment plans to minimize traffic generation (“State Policy Options” 17-20). 
 
5. Strategic Recommendations 
 
In 2009, New Jersey unveiled the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) for the 
fiscal years 2010 through 2019.  Included in this document is a list of anticipated projects for 
NJDOT and NJ TRANSIT, their total funding requirements, and the amount of that funding 
which is expected to come from the TTF.  Starting with fiscal year 2012, STIP estimates a 3%-
per-year growth rate in the TTFA’s capital program from its 2011 base of $1.6 billion.  By 2019, 
annual funding requirements are expected to exceed $2 billion.   Between 2012 and 2019, STIP 
estimates that the total funding required to be provided by the TTF for NJDOT and NJ 
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TRANSIT projects will be nearly $14.7 billion (“FY 2010-2019 New Jersey Statewide 
Transportation Improvement Program”).  In addition to this amount, debt service obligations on 
current outstanding debt will total more than $7.3 billion over the same time period, with annual 
payments for both TTFA and NJ TRANSIT bonds of around $915 million (state.nj.us/ttfa).  For 
a complete schedule of the TTFA’s current debt service obligations, refer to Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Current Debt Service Schedule (Millions of Dollars) (As of 3-31-2011) 
(Source: Transportation Trust Fund Authority) 
 
FY 
TTFA State 
Contract Bonds 
NJT 
COPs 
Funded from 
TTF 
Total Debt 
Service 
2011 807.0 
 
94.7 
 
901.7 
 
2012 820.3 94.4 914.7 
2013 822.2 
 
93.6 
 
915.8 
2014 823.0 
 
92.8 
 
915.8 
2015 840.0 
 
75.8 
 
915.8 
2016 839.9 
 
75.8 
 
915.7 
2017 844.8 
 
71.1 
 
915.9 
2018 842.4 
 
73.5 
 
915.9 
2019 856.9 
 
59.0 
 
915.9 
2020 915.8 
 
0.0 
 
915.8 
2021 915.9 
 
0.0 
 
915.9 
2022 915.8 0.0 
 
915.8 
2023 915.8 0.0 
 
915.8 
2024 915.8 0.0 
 
915.8 
2025 888.6 0.0 
 
888.6 
2026 884.2 0.0 
 
884.2 
2027 880.3 0.0 
 
880.3 
2028 878.8 0.0 
 
878.8 
2029 877.5 0.0 
 
877.5 
2030 668.1 0.0 
 
668.1 
2031 670.7 0.0 
 
670.7 
2032 673.6 0.0 
 
665.6 
2033 654.3 0.0 
 
654.3 
2034 679.4 0.0 
 
679.4 
2035 679.4 0.0 
 
679.4 
2036 710.9 0.0 
 
710.9 
2037 678.6 0.0 
 
678.6 
2038 656.8 0.0 
 
656.8 
2039 716.5 0.0 
 
716.5 
2040 795.6 0.0 
 
795.6 
2041 672.9 0 672.9 
Total 24,742.0 730.8 25,472.8 
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In total, required financing for debt obligations and capital program funding over the 
eight-year period will be nearly $22 billion, with annual financing requirements ranging from 
nearly $2.6 billion in 2012 to more than $2.9 billion in 2019.  With annual appropriation 
revenues at their current level of only $895 million, this leaves an annual financing gap ranging 
from nearly $1.7 billion in 2012 to more than $2 billion in 2019.  The total funding deficit for the 
eight-year period will reach nearly $15 billion.  For detailed calculations of the financing deficit 
for each year between 2012 and 2019, refer to Table 5A. 
 
Table 5A: Expected Financing Deficits 
 
 
Traditionally, the TTFA would finance this gap by issuing debt.  However, as discussed 
above, New Jersey cannot and should not continue issuing debt if at all possible.  Doing so 
would only increase future debt obligations and widen the gap between required financing and 
available funding.  However, to meet financing requirements without using debt, New Jersey 
would have to more-than-triple the current level of appropriation revenues to the TTFA.  This 
would require substantial tax increases for New Jersey citizens. 
JPMorgan estimates that increasing the motor fuels tax by one cent would generate 
around $50 million in additional revenue per year (Kaske “Transportation Debt”).  Therefore, 
increasing the motor fuels tax to provide additional financing of $15 billion over eight years 
would require a tax-hike of around 37.5 cents.  Such a substantial tax-hike would increase the 
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current state gas tax from 10.5 cents, which is the third lowest in the nation behind Wyoming and 
Alaska, to 48 cents, which would be the highest in the nation (www.taxfoundation.org).  To fill 
up a 16 gallon tank would cost drivers an additional $6.  With gas prices already as high as they 
are, such a high tax increase would undoubtedly be met with enormous opposition.  Therefore, it 
is unlikely that New Jersey will be able to solve its problems with a gas tax hike alone.  Even a 
substantially-more moderate increase in the fuel tax would likely face major resistance. 
 Clearly, due to its overwhelming debt burdens, financing the TTF deficit without 
continuing to issue new debt will not be easy.  New Jersey will need to implement a variety of 
strategic policy options in order to raise the revenues that it needs to finance its transportation 
program and meet its debt obligations.  This paper makes the following recommendations for 
increasing revenues dedicated to the TTF: 
 
• Increase the motor fuels tax: Since it was founded, the TTF’s largest source of revenues 
has always been the motor fuels tax.  Over the past two-plus decades, however, the 
purchasing power of the revenues collected from the motor fuels tax has steadily 
declined, as the 10.5-cent-per-gallon tax rate has remained completely flat, without even 
being adjusted for inflation.  According to William C. Vantuono, editor of the trade 
journal Railway Age: 
 
 Gas taxes aren’t the only way to fund public transportation programs, but 
it’s the route the State of New Jersey has taken, and up until now it’s 
worked pretty well.  The state’s gas-tax supported Transportation Trust 
Fund (TTF) is largely-responsible for some of the most ambitious transit 
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programs undertaken anywhere.  Without it, where would New Jersey be?  
The state is about to find out.  As of 2011, the TTF will be bankrupt, with 
all revenue going toward debt service.  Former Governor Jon Corzine 
temporarily averted a crisis a few years ago by restructuring debt.  Now, 
however, it may be time to face the music, and it’s not a pretty tune.  
Despite the fact that New Jersey has the nation’s third-lowest gas tax… 
the new administration of Governor Chris Christie is adopting the familiar 
old political refrain: “Tax-and-spend isn’t the way to go.”  What?  Does 
this really make any sense in a state that has been successfully taxing 
gasoline to pay for its transportation system? 
 
According to Vantuono, debt restructuring plans and plans contingent on 
obtaining additional federal funding are ways of avoiding the obvious and 
simplest solution: “Raise the gas tax to where it needs to be.”  While the 37.5-cent 
increase discussed above may be unfeasible, not raising the tax at all is even more 
unfeasible.  Despite having the nation’s third-highest per capita capital investment 
program for public transportation (NCHRP Report 569), New Jersey’s primary 
source of funding for that program, the motor fuels tax, is the third-lowest in the 
nation.  This simply does not make sense, and, as has been proven over the past 
two decades, this is not sustainable.  Simply put, the motor fuels tax must be 
increased.  Back in 2003, the Blue Ribbon Transportation Commission 
recommended an increase of 12.5 cents, which the Legislature disregarded.  Not 
only would this increase be reasonable and equitable, but it would actually be 
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quite conservative.  Although a 37.5-cent-increase might be too drastic, a 20-cent 
increase would be more than fair.  This increase would raise, approximately, an 
additional $1 billion in financing revenues each year, which would be enough to 
cover all existing debt obligations.  A 20-cent increase in the motor fuels tax 
would cost a driver filling up a 16-gallon tank an additional $3.20.  Compared to 
what drivers are already paying at the pump, this would be a fairly small 
concession.  For the past two decades, New Jersey drivers have been paying 
relatively little in the way of motor fuels taxes.  They have benefitted from one of 
the largest transportation programs in the nation without having to really pay for 
it.  Instead, the State has bonded the TTF to the point of bankruptcy.  Now, the 
time has come for New Jersey drivers to finally pay for the transportation 
program that they have been benefitting from for years.  Added annual revenue: 
$1 billion. 
 
• Redirect all revenues from the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax to the TTF: For 
the past decade, the Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax has raised, on average, 
$224.1 million.  However, each year only the constitutionally-mandated amount of $200 
million has been dedicated to the TTF, while the remaining revenues have been 
contributed to the General Fund for no specific purpose (state.nj.us/ttfa).  New Jersey 
should amend the constitutional mandate to require that all revenues raised by the 
Petroleum Products Gross Receipts Tax be dedicated to the TTF.  This would provide 
additional funding for transportation capital programs of around $24.13 million per year.  
Added annual revenue: $24.1 million. 
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• Redirect revenues from good driver vehicle registration surcharges to the TTF: As 
discussed above, good driver surcharges generate revenues of around $70 million each 
year.  Currently these fees are statutorily-earmarked for the TTF, but they are not 
constitutionally-dedicated to it.  Because of this, the TTF has not received any good 
driver surcharge revenues since 2001.  These revenues should be redirected back to the 
TTF, as originally intended.  If an amendment were made to constitutionally-dedicate 
these revenues to the TTF, it would generate approximately $70 million in additional 
transportation funding capital per year.  Added annual revenue: $70 million. 
 
• Redirect revenues from heavy truck fees to the TTF: Heavy truck fees include a 3-cent 
premium on the excise tax for diesel fuels and an increase in registration fees for heavy 
trucks.  Like good driver surcharges, the revenues from these heavy truck fees are also 
only statutorily-earmarked for the TTF and have not actually been appropriated to it since 
2001.  The Trust Fund statute dictates that at least $30 million in revenues from heavy 
truck fees be dedicated to the TTF annually.  This requirement should be mandated by 
constitutional amendment to ensure that the $30 million is appropriated to the TTF.  
Added annual revenue: $30 million. 
 
• Redirect revenues from all toll road contributions to the TTF: As discussed above, New 
Jersey’s two highway authorities, the NJTA and the SJTA dedicate a combined $28.1 
million each year to the State for transportation capital purposes.  Of this amount, only 
$12 million is appropriated annually to the TTF.  Constitutionally mandating all toll road 
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contributions to the TTF would yield additional revenues of $16.1 million annually.  
Added annual revenue: $16.1 million. 
 
In total, these recommendations would create, approximately, an additional $1,140.2 
million in additional financing for the TTF each year.  However, as shown in Table 5B, this is 
still insufficient to cover the financing deficit.  Between 2012 and 2019, the aggregate deficit in 
required financing would still be almost $5.7, with annual deficits ranging from $527.5 million 
in 2012 to $907.6 million in 2019.  Although this is significantly down from the previously-
mentioned deficit of nearly $15 billion, it is still significant.  To account for this shortfall, New 
Jersey has three options: 1) provide further sources of additional revenues, 2) cutback on 
transportation programs planned under STIP, or 3) resort to issuing debt.  None of these options 
are desirable, but years of careless reliance on debt have left New Jersey with no other choices. 
 
Table 5B: Remaining Expected Financing Deficit 
 
 
 The first option would allow New Jersey to go through with all of the planned 
transportation projects, but would require a significant amount of additional revenues beyond 
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those proposed above.  This would require levering even more taxes, which would doubtlessly be 
met with substantial opposition.  The State might consider increasing the motor fuels tax beyond 
the proposed 20-cent increase, but this may not be practical.  The remaining deficit could also be 
paid out of the General Fund, but this would detract from other essential projects and services 
that the State is responsible for.  Finding new, justifiable revenue sources would be difficult, but 
it is definitely an option that should be considered and implemented if possible. 
 If the State cannot find additional sources of revenues or cannot justify levering more 
taxes, it will be left with two options.  The first is to cut spending.  In this case, the State would 
need to reexamine all proposed transportation projects and eliminate those that are the least 
essential.  Considering the lack of available financing for the TTF, New Jersey should already be 
doing this anyway.  Slashing the STIP budget by an additional $5.7 billion over the next eight 
years might not be realistically possible if most of the planned projects are considered necessary 
and essential.  In his January 2008 State of the State address Jon Corzine said, “Please ... let’s not 
insult each other or the public with empty rhetoric about that we can pay down the debt and fund 
transportation improvements if we ‘just cut more spending and get rid of all waste, fraud and 
abuse,’” (Corzine).  While the State should make every effort to cut spending and eliminate 
waste, there is only so much spending that can be cut.  Most transportation projects are probably 
not expendable, and slashing the transportation budget by $5.7 billion may not be feasible. 
 The final option, if sufficient revenues cannot be raised and the budget cannot be 
sufficiently cut, is to resort to issuing more debt to cover the remaining financing requirement.  
The original Transportation Trust Fund Statute stated that, “The authority shall minimize debt 
incurrence by first relying on appropriations and other revenues available to the authority before 
incurring debt secured by State revenues to meet its statutory purposes,” (NJSA 27:1B-9).   In 
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keeping with this intention, debt should only be used as a last resort.  In spite of this, New Jersey 
has, for the past two decades, used debt as its first resort.  If the State were to establish policies 
for the TTF to ensure that is only used as a last resort, the TTFA could strategically use small 
amounts of debt to cover financing deficits.  However, the problem with this now is that any 
further issuances of debt will only increase debt service obligations, which will require ever-
increasing amounts of revenues to meet.  As established above, the TTFA must begin paying 
down its outstanding debt.  As long as payments to debt principal exceed issuances of debt, the 
TTFA can do this.  However, the more new debt that is issued, the longer it will take to do this, 
and the longer the TTFA will have to pay burdensome interest expenses that will detract from 
funding available for projects.  This is why debt must be a last resort and avoided if possible. 
 Ultimately, to cover the remaining $5.7 billion deficit over the next eight years after the 
adoption of the recommendations made above, New Jersey would likely have to implement a 
strategic combination of the three options.  In this case, it should cut costs as much as possible 
and consider any possible new revenue streams.  Debt should only be used as a last resort and 
only as long as debt principal payments exceed any new debt issuances. 
 
6. Additional Long-Term Recommendations 
 
Beyond the short-term financing plan outlined above for preventing the bankruptcy of the TTF, 
additional measures should be taken to ensure the Fund’s long-term solvency and to make sure 
that such a crisis does not occur again. 
 Back in 2003, the Blue Ribbon Commission made a set of recommendations for ensuring 
a strong transportation system, as discussed above.  This paper stresses that New Jersey finally 
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adopt those recommendations, particularly the recommendations for ensuring adherence to strict 
financial standards and for mandating public accountability by setting up a Financial Review 
Committee.  Among the financial standards, the TTFA should have strict limitations on the types 
and amounts of bonds it can issue.  For example, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended 
that the TTFA adhere to a 50/50 pay-as-you-go/bonding ratio.  This paper holds that even this 
ratio is not strict enough.  Bonding should be kept to a minimum and used only as a last resort.  
Once again, if it is used, it must be only to cover financing shortfalls.  Unless backed by 
sufficient future revenues, no bonds should ever be issued.  An independent Financial Review 
Committee would oversee and approve of all financial decisions made by the TTFA and ensure 
adherence to the financial standards.  By enforcing stricter standards and mandating public 
accountability, the committee would ensure that the TTF remains solvent and that future 
financial crises do not again burden the transportation system of New Jersey. 
 In addition, New Jersey needs to index its motor fuels tax to keep up with the rising costs 
and inflation and to maintain its purchasing power.  Nonetheless, even an indexed fuel tax will 
not be sustainable over the long-term, as consumers become more fuel-efficient and less 
dependent on petroleum products.  Because of this, New Jersey needs to consider alternative 
revenue sources for the long term, such as a vehicle miles traveled fee that uses GPS systems to 
keep track of the number of miles driven.  This type of tax would be more sustainable over the 
long term than the motor fuels tax and would better match up with the costs of repairing road 
damage.  However, because it will take a significant amount of time to switch over to such a 
system, New Jersey needs to start considering the option sooner rather than later. 
 Finally, all revenues intended to support the transportation program should be 
constitutionally-dedicated to the TTF to ensure that they are not misappropriated to the General 
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Fund, as has been the case for the past several years with statutorily-dedicated sources of revenue 
like good driver surcharges and heavy truck fees. 
 Although New Jersey needs to focus right now on implementing an immediate and 
effective solution for solving the TTF’s financial crisis, it must not lose sight of the future.  If a 
long-term plan is not in place to ensure financial responsibility and sufficient revenue, another 
transportation crisis will be inevitable for New Jersey. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
New Jersey’s transportation system is clearly in a state of crisis.  After years of irresponsibly 
relying on debt to finance its ambitious transportation program, the State has managed to 
bankrupt its Transportation Trust Fund.  Now, as William Vantuono says, it is “time to face the 
music.”  Beyond no longer being able to finance future transportation projects, by the start of 
fiscal year 2012 this coming July, the TTF’s revenues will not even be sufficient to cover its 
existing debt obligations.  New Jersey must put an end to what has been referred to as, among 
other things, its “narcotic of debt” (Robins 1) and its “spiral of debt” (Regional Plan Association 
3).  To do so, it needs real, effective solutions, and it needs them now. 
 New Jersey cannot allow the TTF to become insolvent and it cannot apply another quick-
fix, Band-Aid solution that is only going to delay the problem and make it worse by using new 
debt to pay off old debt.  The TTF must pay down its outstanding debt and return to being a 
“pay-as-you-go” system, as was originally intended.  Simply put, the TTF needs substantially 
more revenues.  The simplest and most logical solution is to raise the State’s abnormally low gas 
tax, a tax that has not been adjusted since 1988 and that is currently the among the lowest in the 
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country.  For years, politicians have avoided doing what must be done because they do not want 
to be the ones to make the unpopular decision to increase taxes.  While increasing taxes is never 
a popular decision, right now, for New Jersey, it is a completely necessary decision.  Politicians 
have put their own agendas above the public welfare for too long, and it must stop.  To quote 
William Vantuono, “You may lose the next election, but at least you’ve done what’s necessary 
for the greater good of your constituents.  Isn’t that what being a public servant is all about?” 
In a 2004 article titled “The Crisis in State Transportation Finance: Lessons Learned from 
the New Jersey Experience,” Martin E. Robins concluded: 
 
Thus, the sobering lesson learned is that the combination of lofty intentions to 
build glamorous, “big ticket” highway and transit projects, freeze fare levels, 
reduce transit operating assistance and not raise new gasoline taxes, all supported 
by addictive debt financing, will produce a serious financial hangover – in this 
case insolvency of New Jersey’s Transportation Trust Fund.  Without built-in 
independent safeguards for the preservation of its financial integrity, a model of 
capital-generating mechanisms, such as the Transportation Trust Fund, can be 
wrecked by the “narcotic of debt” and its induced dream state that hard decisions 
need not be addressed (Robins 10). 
 
In the nearly seven years since this article, New Jersey has still not addressed those hard 
decisions or learned its lessons; it has still not woken up from it “induced dream state;” and it has 
still not ended its “narcotic of debt.”  Now time has all but run out.  New Jersey must finally 
learn these lessons and make the tough decisions now or face dire consequences. 
48 
 
 By redirecting misappropriated revenues back to the TTF, implementing an equitable 
increase it the motor fuels tax (this paper suggests 20 cents per gallon), cutting costs on non-
essential projects, and reducing its reliance on debt by adhering to strict financial standards 
enforced by a Financial Policy Review Committee, New Jersey can still clean up the mess that it 
has created over the past two decades.  It will not be easy, but it must be done.  According to the 
Regional Plan Association, “It would be an understatement to say that breaking this cycle of debt 
will be politically difficult.  Governor Chris Christie has been vocal about not raising taxes, but 
without several hundred million dollars in new revenue dedicated to the Trust Fund, New Jersey 
will lose the transportation system that our economy depends on.  Governor Christie and the 
Legislature have a responsibility to acknowledge this imminent crisis and adopt real, effective 
solutions,” (Regional Plan Association 11).  Whether or not this will happen remains to be seen, 
but it seems doubtful.  We can only hope that Governor Christie and the State Legislature listen 
to reason and do what needs to be done, not for the good of their political careers, but for the 
good of the State of New Jersey—before it is too late. 
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